



Adaptive Water Law 
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important questions concerning the governance of 
water resources in the U.S. is whether American water law regimes can 
become increasingly adaptive to changing conditions and sudden 
disturbances.  Abundant evidence suggests that water law is non-adaptive 
or maladaptive.  Many significant legal rules and processes governing 
water are static, rigid, and fragmented. 
Three legal developments in the latter half of 2013 illustrate the 
kinds of maladaptive effects that water law can have.  First, U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation officials, environmentalists, and other stakeholders in the 
Colorado River have acknowledged that the Colorado River Compact’s 
1922 allocation of water quantities cannot be achieved under drought-
driven, dwindling flows and increasing demand, particularly from 
growing Nevada and Arizona communities.
1
  An August 2013 Bureau 
operations plan identified a 50% chance that Nevada and Arizona will 
have their water deliveries cut by 2016, in part because the Colorado 
River basin has suffered its two consecutively driest years in a century.
2
 
More fundamentally, the Compact’s allocation scheme is based on 
river flows that are mismatched to expected decreases in precipitation 
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and streamflows in the future.
3
  Likewise, the allocations are mismatched 
to actual demand for the water, particularly from the major metropolises 
of Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and Phoenix, all of which grew 
exponentially after the Compact was negotiated.
4
  Patricia Mulroy, 
former general manager of both the Southern Nevada Water Authority 
and the Las Vegas Valley Water District and one of the nation’s most 
powerful managers of water, has responded by calling for a renegotiation 
of the Colorado River Compact, federal disaster aid, and a plan to pump 
84,000 acre-feet of groundwater from rural, eastern Nevada to Las 
Vegas.
5
  The groundwater pump-and-pipe plan hit a legal snag in 
December 2013 when a state judge ruled that the state water engineer 
needed to recalculate the project’s environmental impacts and how those 
impacts would be mitigated.
6
  Mulroy retired in February 2014, which 
could leave a power vacuum.
7
 
The existing rules governing water in the Colorado River Basin may 
shape or impede solutions, but they seem unlikely to create solutions to 
the basic problem of decreasing supply and increasing demand.  While 
urban growth and inefficient water uses are clearly causes of the 
problem,
8
 simply cutting off the water supply to an existing urban 
population is not a politically or socially feasible option, regardless of 
how ill-conceived the location of Las Vegas is.  Mulroy emphasizes that 
all basin stakeholders share in the risk that any of them face.
9
  The once 
seemingly secure water allocations of the Colorado River Compact, the 
prior appropriation doctrine, and state groundwater laws are now of 
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limited comfort to Las Vegas, the other Colorado River basin states and 
cities, and eastern Nevada farmers. 
In a second example of maladaptive water law, Texas groundwater 
laws and property rights doctrines are hampering groundwater 
conservation districts’ capacities to manage groundwater supplies 
sustainably, including the ability to deny pumping permits or require 
curtailment of pumping under conditions that threaten aquifers.  The 
Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the rule of capture governs 
groundwater rights in Texas, even though virtually every other state has 
overruled or abandoned this rule.
10
  The rule of capture recognizes the 
right of landowners overlying groundwater sources, such as aquifers, to 
exploit the resource by pumping as much as they want, which essentially 
incentivizes a race to extract more water faster than one’s neighbors who 
also overlie the same groundwater source.
11
  Even though the Texas 
Legislature has created groundwater conservation districts to regulate 
groundwater pumping and conserve the shared resource,
12
 the Texas 
Supreme Court held that landowners own unpumped water under their 
land and can seek just compensation for takings if groundwater 
management districts restrict their pumping of that water.
13
 
On November 13, 2013, a Texas appellate court handed down its 
decision in a takings case involving the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s 
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Act of May 20, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 783, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws _____. 
 13. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 838 (Tex. 2012) (“[L]andowners do 
have a constitutionally compensable interest in groundwater . . . .”). 
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restriction on the amount of water pecan farmers were permitted to pump 
from the aquifer.
14
  Even though the court acknowledged “the importance 
of [groundwater regulations to] protecting terrestrial and aquatic life, 
domestic and municipal water suppliers, the operation of existing 
industries, and the economic development of the state,” it held that the 
Authority had taken the farmers’ property and owed them just 
compensation.
15
  The farmers bought their lands before the regulations 
were enacted, but then needed regulatory approval for the increased 
amounts of groundwater required by their now-mature pecan trees.
16
  The 
appellate court concluded that the farmers had a compensable property 
right to “the unlimited use of water to irrigate a commercial-grade pecan 
orchard.”
17
   
The opinion ignores several key facts: the aquifer does not have 
unlimited amounts of water; those waters are shared by many overlying 
landowners who are in competition with one another to pump a limited 
resource; the aquifer provides most of the drinking water for San 
Antonio’s large metropolitan population; the aquifer has to be 
maintained at certain levels to support species protected by the 
Endangered Species Act; and the aquifer’s long-term viability has 
become increasingly threatened by overpumping and pollution.
18
  A 
property entitlement to pump an unlimited amount of water, secured 
against government regulation by the Takings Clause, is unsustainable 
and is illusory against changing conditions and the actions of other water 
users. 
The mismatches between law and social-ecological conditions are 
not limited to the West, though.  An example of problems facing eastern 
states appears in litigation over the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) failure to set quantitative nutrient standards for the 
Mississippi River Basin.
19
  Nutrient runoff, primarily nitrogen and 
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 15. Id. at 145, 146. 
 16. Id. at 124. 
 17. Id. at 152. 
 18. See generally AQUIFER GUARDIANS IN URBAN AREAS, PROTECTING THE EDWARDS 
AQUIFER: VULNERABILITY, CONTAMINATION, EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENT, AND INADEQUACY OF 
ENGINEERED CONTROLS (2005), available at http://www.aquiferguardians.org/PDF/AGUA-
Protecting_Edwards_Aquifer.pdf; Edwards Aquifer Info, EDWARDS AQUIFER RESEARCH & DATA 
CENTER, http://www.eardc.txstate.edu/about/aquifer-info.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).  
 19. See Gulf Restoration Network v. Jackson, No. 2:12-cv-00677, 2013 BL 253612, at *1–2 
(E.D. La., Sept. 20, 2013), available at http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/files/gulf_restoration_network 
_v_jackson.pdf (order granting in part and denying in part Gulf Restoration Network’s motion for 
summary judgment urging the EPA to regulate nitrogen and phosphorous pollution in the 
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phosphorus, is a major, persistent, water-quality problem in the U.S.
20
  
Nutrient runoff from farms, cities, suburbs, and wastewater treatment 
facilities throughout the thirty-one-state Mississippi River Basin has 
caused a large hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico, killing and 
preventing biological life in an area amounting to nearly 6,000 square 
miles.
21
  A consortium of environmental groups filed a lawsuit against 
the EPA over its failure to set quantitative water quality standards for 
nutrients under the Clean Water Act.
22
  In September 2013, a U.S. 
District Court judge in Louisiana ruled that the EPA was acting 
arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to decide whether to set 
quantitative nutrient standards or to develop Total Maximum Daily 
Loads (TMDLs) of nutrients for the entire Mississippi River Basin.
23
 
The ruling, hailed as a victory by environmental groups,
24
 might 
ultimately lead to some increased actions to control nutrient runoff, but it 
is hardly a solution to a complex and far-reaching problem.  The court 
only required the EPA to make a decision; it did not order the EPA to 
adopt quantitative standards, specify any particular quantities of 
impermissible nutrient levels, or require specific actions to reduce 
nutrient loading or runoff.
25
  The Clean Water Act continues to offer 
agricultural producers a substantial degree of protection from regulation 
of their nonpoint source runoff, including nutrient runoff from farms and 
ranches.
26
  The agricultural sector of the U.S. economy has strong 
influence over laws and policy solutions to environmental problems 
involving agricultural producers.
27
  Any establishment of TMDLs for 
nutrients in particular waterways and subsequent state actions to prevent 
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AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2013); Ruhl, supra note 20, at 296–305. 
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violations of those TMDLs from throughout the relevant watershed will 
likely be slow and only partially effective at best.
28
  Litigation to force 
states to set and comply with TMDLs takes time and resources, and does 
not automatically create authority to regulate land uses, prohibit farmers 
or residential landowners from applying fertilizers to their lands, force 
landowners to manage waste from pets or livestock (or even wildlife, 
such as in the case of deer overpopulation), conserve critical lands, or 
restrict private property rights.
29
 
Moreover, today’s regulations may be ill-suited to tomorrow’s 
problems.  In particular, water quality standards and TMDLs are based 
on average conditions and sources of pollutants at a fixed point in time.
30
  
Thus, they are not particularly flexible to peaks and valleys in 
stormwater runoff and streamflows, which may become more extreme as 
climate patterns change.
31
  They also address only one narrow aspect of a 
set of interconnected water problems.  There are no guarantees that 
compliance with water quality standards for one set of pollutants will be 
coordinated with compliance standards for other pollutants or with 
solutions addressing other problems affecting the waterway.  These other 
problems might include drought and reduced streamflows, flooding and 
high levels and velocities of runoff, impacts on aquatic and terrestrial 
species and their habitats, loss or degradation of wetlands, land-use and 
development patterns (e.g., sprawl), water consumption, impacts on 
fishing and fisheries, and many others.
32
  Litigation and regulation to set 
and enforce TMDLs for specific water pollutants play important, needed 
roles in protecting and governing water resources, but they are piecemeal 
tools that address only fragments of larger, interconnected water 
problems affecting both nature and society. 
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These examples illustrate three maladaptive elements of water law: a 
reliance on law for a false security against change, rigid rules that 
impede adaptation, and a fragmented structure that fails to address 
interconnected water problems and decisions.  This article argues that in 
order for society, communities, water governance institutions, and 
aquatic ecosystems to be resilient to stresses and disturbances from 
interconnected social-ecological change, water law will need to become 
increasingly adaptive.  To do so, it will need to shift towards mechanisms 
for sharing risk, conditional and flexible standards, and integrated water 
governance structures.  This article applies a relatively new framework 
of “adaptive law” to water law in order to identify several features of an 
adaptive water law system.  Moreover, the evolution towards adaptive 
water law is already underway: while some aspects of water law remain 
maladaptive, the emergence and evolution of watershed governance 
institutions have infused some risk-sharing, conditional and flexible 
standards, and integrated water governance into water law.  Watersheds 
are areas of land that drain to a common body of water, and are the 
ecosystem units at which hydrology and land-water-environment 
processes and functions occur, making them appropriate and useful 
scales for water governance and problem solving.
33
  The article uses case 
studies from several different kinds of watersheds to explore how 
adaptation for social-ecological resilience can develop in watershed 
governance.  The article concludes with the observation that watershed 
governance institutions are not panaceas and encounter many obstacles 
to adaptive water governance, yet they offer great promise for improving 
the adaptive capacity of water law in the U.S. 
II. WATER LAW AND SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE 
A. The Adaptive Capacity Imperative 
Water law must become more adaptive to changing social and 
ecological conditions.  The static, rigid, and fragmented features of water 
law systems are not merely contributing to dried-up streams, shrinking 
aquifers, polluted waterways, flooded communities, imperiled species, 
and feuding water users.  These features are also putting our 
communities and social-ecological systems at heightened risk of decline 
and collapse.  Society’s capacity to respond to disturbances and 
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ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 417, 422–31 (2010). 
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uncertainties is critical to navigating the dynamics of linked social and 
environmental systems, and water law plays an important role in either 
impeding or facilitating this adaptation. 
Social systems and ecosystems, such as watersheds, are interlinked 
with one another in complex and dynamic ways, creating cross-system 
effects in which changes or behaviors in one system create disturbances 
in other systems.
34
  These disturbances might produce changes in other 
systems that are remote in time and space (i.e., nonlinear), including 
cascades of change, systemic collapse, and transition (sometimes known 
as systemic “flipping”) to an alternate state.
35
  According to resilience 
science, systems can exist in multiple stable states and disturbances 
(sometimes called “perturbations”) can trigger rapid change from one 
system to another, particularly if a system has lost resilience.
36
  
Resilience is the capacity of a system to adapt to disturbances without 
losing its essential functions and structure.
37
 
Society’s “business as usual” consumptive patterns and practices—
including building major cities in deserts or floodplains, water-intensive 
farming or land-development practices, damming and other re-
engineering of natural water systems, and using waters as sinks and 
drains for pollutants and polluted runoff—can cause the decline and 
substantial transformation of aquatic ecosystems.
38
  Moreover, a broad 
range of disturbances in our social systems—including economic decline 
and public fiscal crises, political gridlock among Congress and 
presidential administrations, changes in population makeup and 
locations, and judicial decisions reinterpreting the scope of the Clean 
Water Act or other water laws—can significantly affect water resources 
and aquatic systems.
39
  Ecological changes—such as prolonged drought, 
high-intensity floods, the proliferation of invasive species, changes in 
climate patterns, and others—can substantially impact human 
                                                          
 34. See generally PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL 
SYSTEMS (Lance H. Gunderson & C. S. Holling eds., 2002). 
 35. See generally DISCONTINUITIES IN ECOSYSTEMS AND OTHER COMPLEX SYSTEMS (Craig R. 
Allen & C. S. Holling eds., 2008). 
 36. Craig R. Allen et al., Commentary on Part One Articles, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL 
RESILIENCE 3, 6 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 2009). 
 37. BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS AND 
PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD xiii (2006). 
 38. See GLENNON, supra note 8; id. at 2–3, 15–27, 39–52, 96–110; Lance H. Gunderson et al., 
Water RATs (Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability) in Lake and Wetland Social-Ecological 
Systems, 11(1) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 16 (2006). 
 39. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Law and Resilience, 43 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10426, 10429, 10431, 10439–40 (2013). 
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communities, economies, public policies, and even laws.
40
 
Perhaps, most significantly, societal actions can reduce the resilience 
of ecosystems, which in turn reduces the resilience of society and social 
systems.
41
  One prominent example was the Dust Bowl: unsustainable 
agricultural policies and farming practices, when combined with 
substantial and prolonged drought, produced dust storms that stripped 
away the topsoil, killed and hurt people, harmed the farmland ecology of 
the southern Great Plains, and irreparably changed communities and 
people’s lives.
42
  Another prominent example was Hurricane Katrina’s 
impacts on New Orleans: our resource management policies substantially 
reduced coastal plain wetlands, placed vulnerable urban populations in 
low-lying areas, and relied on human-engineered systems to hold back 
storm surge, all of which changed the fundamental capacity of southern 
Louisiana’s natural systems to absorb storm surge from a major 
hurricane, which in turn led to major flooding, loss of life and property, 
the collapse of civil society during the disaster, the lack of effective 
governance capacity during the disaster, and a fundamental change to the 
structure and functions of the New Orleans community.
43
  In the case of 
Katrina, the feedback loops from society to nature to society and back to 
nature because the damage may contribute to more climate change.  A 
study in Science used empirical data and extrapolation to predict that 
dying vegetation from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita may release an 
amount of carbon equivalent to 50% to 140% of all the carbon that 
forests in the U.S. absorb from photosynthesis in an entire year.
44
   
                                                          
 40. Id. at 10427–28; Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Law to Public Necessity: Reframing 
Climate Change Adaptation as Emergency Response and Preparedness, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 709 
(2010); Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamic Water Management in 
the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 55, 57–62 (2007). 
 41. See PANARCHY, supra note 34. 
 42. See TIMOTHY EGAN, THE WORST HARD TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THOSE WHO 
SURVIVED THE GREAT AMERICAN DUSTBOWL (2006); DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOWL: THE 
SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930S (1979). 
 43. See CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, PUB. NO. 512, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE 
AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE KATRINA 10–23 (2005), available at http://www.progressivereform. 
org/articles/Unnatural_Disaster_512.pdf; R. W. Kates et al., Reconstruction of New Orleans After 
Hurricane Katrina: A Research Perspective, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14653 (2006); Colin D. 
Woodroffe et al., Landscape Variability and the Response of Asian Megadeltas to Environmental 
Change, in GLOBAL CHANGE AND INTEGRATED COASTAL MANAGEMENT: THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
REGION 277, 308 (Nick Harvey ed., 2006).  For the social and distributive justice implications of 
Katrina, see MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER, AND 
RACE AFTER KATRINA (2006), available at http://katrinareader.org/sites/katrinareader.org/files/wake 
_of_the_storm.pdf. 
 44. Jeffrey Q. Chambers et al., Hurricane Katrina’s Carbon Footprint on U.S. Gulf Coast 
Forests, 318 SCI. 1107, 1107 (2007). 
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Indeed, an example of social-ecological dynamics that many 
communities are facing today is climate change.  Society’s practices that 
emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere are changing climate 
conditions and patterns, which in turn are affecting water resources and 
producing prolonged and severe drought, high-intensity floods, more 
extreme storm events, hotter temperatures that increase consumptive 
demand for water, changes in evaporation and evapotranspiration rates, 




Moreover, the future is uncertain, at least partially and in significant 
ways.  Past conditions are poor predictors of future conditions, especially 
with respect to water.  Both scientists and legal scholars have declared 
that “stationarity is dead.”
46
  This phrase means that emerging water 
conditions, fluctuations, and trends have no precedent in recent history.
47
  
Therefore, water laws, policies, and management decisions that are based 
on assumptions that aquatic conditions fluctuate within a fixed range 
defined by data from past conditions (i.e., “stationarity”) no longer match 
actual or future conditions.
48
  In many cases, we do not have reliably 
certain models to predict conditions at the relevant geographic scale or 
time scale that we need for making decisions.  For example, climate 
change models about impacts on water systems globally or regionally 
over decades do not simply “scale down” to models that predict climate 
change impacts on particular local watersheds or on annual water flows 
and supplies.
49
  Moreover, we often cannot predict precisely when and 
                                                          
 45. See generally NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF 
GLOBAL CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES 12–13 (2008), available at http://downloads.global 
change.gov/ccsp/CCSP_Scientific_Assessment_Full.pdf; JOEL B. SMITH, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE, A SYNTHESIS OF POTENTIAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE U.S. iv–v, 11–
12 (2004), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/Pew-Synthesis.pdf; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE 
RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 41–42 (2009), 
available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf; Kathleen 
A. Miller, Grappling with Uncertainty: Water Planning and Policy in a Changing Climate, 5 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 395 (2010).  
 46. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles 
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010); P.C.D. Milly et al., 
Stationarity is Dead: Whither Water Management, 319 SCI. 573 (2008). 
 47. Milly et al., supra note 46, at 573.  
 48. Id. 
 49. See TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, FAR WEST TEXAS CLIMATE CHANGE 
CONFERENCE: STUDY FINDINGS AND CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1, 16–17 (2008), available at 
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/special_legislative_reports/doc/climatechange.pdf; 
Lara C. Whitely Binder, Climate Change and Watershed Planning in Washington State, 42 J. AM. 
WATER RES. ASS’N 915, 924–25 (2006).  
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where an ecological system or social system will reach a tipping point 
that creates crisis, sudden decline, or rapid transformation to a different 
state or regime.
50
  For example, resilience science suggests that the 
impacts of land-development and population-growth dynamics on water 
supply capacity or the quality of surface waters and groundwater (or a 
combination of water supplies and quality) are likely to contain surprise 
effects that we have not yet predicted accurately. 
Humans and human organizations make significant mistakes when 
managing natural resources and implementing management decisions.  
This point is partly grounded in what resilience science tells us about the 
characteristics of linked social-ecological systems: complexity, nonlinear 
dynamics, feedbacks between systems that can amplify across scale and 
time, and surprise tipping points that produce unexpected regime 
changes.
51
  However, it is also grounded in limits to human cognitive 
capacity and the nature of organizational behavior.  Humans have 
heuristic biases that affect cognitive processing and lead to mistakes in 
judgments and decisions.
52
  Comprehensive “rational” plans often fail 
due to inaccuracies in prediction of changing conditions and limits in 
organizational capacity to implement plans and make decisions 
according to rational cognitive processes.
53
  Organizational structures, 
mission biases, power allocations, and intra-organizational relationships 
and dynamics often impede rational decision making and accurate 
predictions about the effects of decisions.
54
  Scientific models and data 
may be ill-matched to or disconnected from governance structures, 
processes, and needs.
55
  The potential for enormous up-front mistakes 
from comprehensive, rational, front-end planning of natural resources 
management decisions, in particular, has led scientists and natural 
                                                          
 50. DISCONTINUITIES IN ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 35. 
 51. See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. 
 52. See JAMES G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1988); JAMES G. MARCH & 
HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 203–10 (1958); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1545 (1998).  
 53. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 
(1959) (discussing the difficulties in implementing rational public policies). 
 54. See MARCH, supra note 52; MARCH & SIMON, supra note 52.  For an assessment of the 
inherently change-resistant nature of water organizations, in particular, see Denise Lach et al., 
Maintaining the Status Quo: How institutional Norms and Practices Create Conservative Water 
Organizations, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2027 (2005). 
 55. See David Feldman & Helen Ingram, Making Science Useful to Decision Makers: Climate 
Forecasts, Water Management, and Knowledge Networks, 1 WEATHER, CLIMATE, & SOC’Y 9, 10 
(2009). 
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resources managers to develop a model of adaptive management in 
which resources, such as waters and watersheds, are managed in a series 
of experiments with continual adjustment based on feedback loops of 
monitoring, assessment, and learning.
56
 
Improving the adaptive capacity of water systems requires the use of 
adaptive management methods,
57
 as well as legal reforms to authorize or 
facilitate adaptive management.
58
  It also requires the use of adaptive 
planning methods and processes, particularly in the context of water 
supply planning, water-quality planning, and watershed planning.
59
  
Furthermore, it requires the development of adaptive water governance 
systems.
60
  However, improving the adaptive capacity of water systems 
also requires adaptive features in the legal system itself, particularly 
water law. 
B. The Maladaptive Reality of Water Law 
Many features of water law in the U.S. lack the capacity to adapt to 
changes and disturbances.  Moreover, these features inhibit society from 
adapting to changes and disturbances and contribute to reductions in the 
adaptive capacity of nature and its ecosystems.  Three particular aspects 
of U.S. water law regimes deserve special attention.  They are the 
attempt of water law to provide individuals and organizations with 
security against uncertainty and change, the rigidity of water law, and the 
fragmented nature of water law. 
                                                          
 56. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C. S. Holling ed., 
1978); CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986); Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded 
Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2003); Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management: 
Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431 (1986). 
 57. See Mary Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and Ecological 
Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 950 (2009). 
 58. See Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 59. See Arnold, supra note 33. 
 60. See ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE AND WATER CONFLICT: NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLABORATIVE PLANNING (John T. Scholz & Bruce Stiftel eds., 2005); Barbara A. Cosens & Mark 
Kevin Williams, Resilience and Water Governance: Adaptive Governance in the Columbia River 
Basin, 17(4) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 3 (2012); Per Olsson et al., Shooting the Rapids: Navigating 
Transitions to Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems, 11(1) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 18 
(2006). 
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1. False Security 
Water law often aims to provide its participants with lasting security 
in the allocation and protection of water supplies, conditions, and rights.  
It uses legal rules and processes to lock-in existing conditions and 
protects investments, expectations, and the institutional status quo by 
resisting change.  This security is a false one, though. 
In general, U.S. water law regimes favor the security of private rights 
to use water, which deter adjustments in water allocations and uses as 
new conditions demand.  The prior appropriation doctrine guarantees a 
senior appropriator the right to continue to appropriate and use a specific 
quantity of water that the appropriator has historically put to a beneficial 
use at particular times and in particular locations, as well as the right to 
enforce its priority against junior appropriators when supplies are 
limited.
61
  This is true even if the senior appropriator is making a 
relatively low-value or inefficient use of the water, if sharing would 
maximize the net utility of the water source to society, or if hydrological 
conditions have changed, making it very costly to ensure that adequate 
flows or water pressure reach the senior appropriator.
62
  Moreover, in 
several takings cases, courts have awarded compensation to private 
water-rights holders for government-mandated reduction in their rights 
when environmental and supply conditions have changed.
63
  If 
government regulators adjust water rights to absorb changes or adapt to 
disturbances, they have to compensate the rights-holder as if the 
government is an insurer or guarantor against change.  The judicial 
takings doctrine might even prohibit state courts from changing property 
laws, no matter how incrementally or expectedly in response to changing 
conditions, if they eliminate existing property interests.
64
 
An alternative way for water law to adapt to changing conditions is 
through market transfers of water rights from lower-value uses to higher-
                                                          
 61. Janet C. Neuman, Adaptive Management: How Water Law Needs to Change, 31 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 11432, 11432 (2001). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See., e.g., Tulare Lake Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 324 (2001); 
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Edwards Aquifer 
Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 152–53 (Tex. App. 2013). 
 64. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 724–25 
(2010) (plurality opinion) (dictum); see Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Legal Castles in the Sand: 
The Evolution of Property Law, Culture, and Ecology in Coastal Lands, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213, 
219–24 (2011). 
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value uses.
65
  However, market transfers often face obstacles in the form 
of no-injury rules protecting junior appropriators or area-of-origin 
protections for communities that depend on existing arrangements.
66
  The 
effects are ossification of existing allocations when they no longer make 
sense, and the systemic incapacity to change allocations through legal 
modifications to water rights or market-based transfers. 
Government decisions also fix standards for future behavior on the 
basis of past conditions that may bear very little relationship to future 
conditions or needs.  Interstate compacts persistently guarantee states 
specified allocations of interstate waters based on historic conditions that 
have changed.  Current and projected conditions cannot possibly supply 
the sum of all interstate water allocations that have been guaranteed by 
law.
67
  Likewise, local water supply plans are all too often based on 
“paper rights” rather than “wet water”—actual reliable supplies for the 
foreseeable future.
68
  Government regulators typically set water quality 
standards, TMDLs, and the conditions of permits issued under the Clean 
Water Act based on conditions and projections at a given point in time 
and then do not revise those standards based on new circumstances.
69
  
Likewise, land-use or development permits are meant to create certainty 
for landowners about how property may be used or developed, and it can 
be difficult to add or revise regulatory controls once a project is 
complete.
70
  Thus, many new regulatory standards apply to new permit 
applications but do not require retrofitting or redevelopment of existing 
land uses. 
In many respects, laws, rules, rights, and permits serve as insurance 
policies against change.  The beneficiaries of these certainty-creating 
legal tools have few incentives—or at least perceive that they have few 
                                                          
 65. Mark Squillace, Water Transfers for a Changing Climate, 53 NAT. RES. J. 55, 56–59 
(2013). 
 66. Id. at 59–61; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.22L (West 2013) (regulating 
surface water transfers); Christine A. Klein, Water Transfers: The Case Against Transbasin 
Diversions in the Eastern States, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 249 (2006). 
 67. See Noah Hall, Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation, 5 ENVTL. & 
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 237, 321–322 (2010); MacKinnon, supra note 1. 
 68. See Susan D. Brienza, Wet Water vs. Paper Rights: Indian and Non-Indian Negotiated 
Settlements and Their Effects, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 151, 159–60 (1992); Lincoln L. Davies, Just a 
Big, “Hot Fuss”?: Assessing the Value of Connecting Suburban Sprawl, Land Use, and Water 
Rights Through Assured Supply Laws, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1217, 1282 (2008); Doremus & 
Hanemann, supra note 40, at 72. 
 69. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 41–44.  
 70. For a discussion of the demand for certainty, security, and clear rules in land use regulation, 
see Harvey M. Jacobs, Fighting Over Land: America’s Legacy . . . America’s Future?, 65 J. AM. 
PLANNING ASS’N 141 (1999). 
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incentives—to proactively enhance their capacities to adapt to 
disturbances or change, voluntarily modify existing arrangements based 
on new conditions, or seek out other interested parties for the sharing of 
risks and adaptation strategies.  These perceptions of legally guaranteed 
security deter interested parties from coming to the bargaining table to 
improve the adaptive capacity of water systems; yet the law cannot 
prevent disruptive physical, ecological, and social conditions from 
altering water systems.  Rights-holders are discovering that their rights 
may mean little under unprecedented drought, flood, landscape 
alteration, or climate disruption.  At best, the law will determine who 
pays and who gets paid when disturbances turn legal certainties into 
empirical uncertainties or impossibilities.  The use of law essentially to 
subsidize private risk from social-ecological change imposes substantial 
systemic costs that undermine the resilience of the overall system. 
2. Rigid Rules 
Water law in the U.S. is full of inflexible rules that inhibit adaptive 
responses to disturbances and changes.  One example is the prior 
appropriation system of water rights that governs water allocation in 
western states.  Janet Neuman has summarized the rigidity of the 
doctrine: 
The doctrine is considered a hard-edged, or “crystalline,” set of rules, 
as opposed to the looser “muddy” riparian doctrine followed in more 
water-rich areas.  In other words, where water is a scarce and precious 
resource, the legal system has evolved a set of fairly rigid rules for 
assigning rights to water use.  The prior appropriation doctrine operates 
on a first-in-time, first-in-right principle, where the first person to put 
the water to beneficial use acquires the superior legal right, and junior 
water rights holders must relinquish water in times of shortage.  In 
contrast, the riparian doctrine that pertains where water is more 
plentiful follows a share-and-share-alike principle where everyone (or 
at least each riparian) is entitled to a reasonable share of the water 
resource, and all users cut back on a pro rata basis in times of shortage. 
 Prior appropriation as a system of water allocation is thus rigid in a 
number of ways.  The doctrine locks in and protects historical uses, 
many of which were established over a hundred years ago in the 
western United States, without regard to whether those uses embody 
current views on the “highest and best use” of limited water.  
Approximately 80% of the water use is in irrigated agriculture, in a 
region where natural precipitation ranges as low as a few inches.  
Shortages (which are frequent in arid regions) are handled on a strict 
priority basis, with the more junior water users being cut off.  The 
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doctrine does not reward efficiency; indeed efficiency improvements 
and conservation are often effectively penalized because any water not 
used for the prescribed statutory period of time is considered legally 
forfeited.  The major goals of the system are predictability and certainty 
to support economic investment in consumptive uses of water.  Even 
though water is scarce, water users know exactly where they stand in 
relation to each other, and users can predict on the basis of historical 
patterns how much water they will receive.  Although attempts are 
being made to graft environmental demands for water onto the system, 
the graft has not fully taken, and water use in arid regions is still 
heavily tilted in favor of consumptive and economic uses such as 
irrigation, mining, hydropower, and municipal supply.  Water rights are 




The rigidity of the priority system discourages or prevents adaptive 
sharing of water during shortages.  The combination of measuring rights 
in specific quantities of appropriated water and the use-it-or-lose-it rule 
deter improved efficiencies and adaptive water conservation efforts.  The 
persistence of defining beneficial uses by historic rules and uses prevents 
regulators or courts from determining that some water uses are no longer 
well-adapted to the conditions in which they occur. 
Another type of rigidity in water law is the prevalence of either/or 
classifications.  Water is either surface water or groundwater.  It is either 
subject to the public trust or not.  Pollution entering waterways is either 
from a point source or from a nonpoint source.  Waterways and wetlands 
are either subject to complete federal jurisdiction or they are not subject 
to federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (CWA).
72
  All water 
transfers between water bodies require a National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit or none do under the “unitary 
waters” rule.
73
  If a situation is classified one way it is governed by a 
specific set of rules, but if it is classified the other way it is governed by 
a different set of rules.  There are no hybrid classifications and no 
context-specific exercises of discretion to manage the situation 
adaptively.  For example, transfers between water bodies might need 
some degree of regulatory oversight and assessment of potential impacts 
on water quality and system resilience without triggering the 
                                                          
 71. Neuman, supra note 61, at 11432 (citing Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property 
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988)). 
 72. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006). 
 73. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105–08 (2004); 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 
33,697 (June 13, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). 
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cumbersome, bureaucratic, time-consuming process of obtaining a full-
blown NPDES permit.  Interconnected surface waters and groundwater 
would be more adaptively managed for social-ecological resilience in 




Furthermore, federal environmental laws designed to protect aquatic 
environments are inflexible and lack sufficient adaptive capacity.  For 
example, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) protects aquatic 
environments only if they are inhabited by federally listed endangered or 
threatened species.
75
  It does not prevent degradation of waterways that 
could lead to the decline of currently healthy populations or require 
proactive strategies to enhance the resilience of aquatic systems.  The 
ESA prohibits modifications to habitats that are likely to harm species, 
but does not protect or manage the overall health and functioning of the 
watershed or waterway in which the species exists.
76
  Habitat 
conservation plans under the ESA—as well as environmental-impact 
reports for major federal water projects under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and TMDLs for impaired water 
bodies under the CWA—pre-commit agencies and regulated parties to 
actions and project features that may not be well-suited to future 
conditions, synergistic disturbances, or unexpected transitions from one 
ecosystem state to another.
77
  The front-end, prescriptive characteristic of 
federal environmental laws, including laws governing water resources, is 
maladaptive. 
                                                          
 74. See Christina Hoffman & Sandra Zellmer, Assessing Institutional Ability to Support 
Adaptive, Integrated Water Resources Management, 91 NEB. L. REV. 805 (2013). 
 75. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012). 
 76. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Holly Doremus, Water, Population 
Growth, and Endangered Species in the West, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 361 (2001); Todd H. Votteler, 
The Little Fish That Roared: The Endangered Species Act, Groundwater Law, and Private Property 
Rights Collide Over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL. L. 845 (1998).  For an argument that the 
Endangered Species Act is static and rigid, unable to meet the needs of dynamic interconnected 
ecological and social systems, see Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets 
Dynamic World, 32 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 175 (2010). 
 77. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 41–44 (discussing TMDLs); 
Melinda Harms Benson & Ahjond S. Garmestani, Embracing Panarchy, Building Resilience and 
Integrating Adaptive Management Through a Rebirth of the National Environmental Policy Act, 92 
J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1420 (2011); Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?: Lessons from a 
Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007) (discussing the failures of HCPs); 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s 
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002). 
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3. Fragmentation 
Water law is fragmented.
78
  Entirely different legal regimes—the 
riparian doctrine in eastern states and the prior appropriation doctrine in 
western states—govern rights to use surface waters, although some 
commentators observe that the two regimes have become increasingly 
similar.
79
  In most states, the legal regime governing surface waters 
differs from the legal regime governing groundwater, and there is very 
little effective coordination between the two.
80
  The content of the public 
trust doctrine varies from state to state.
81
  A patchwork of difficult-to-
coordinate federally-created legal interests in surface waters overlay onto 
state water rights doctrines.  These interests include the federal 
navigation servitude, federal and Indian reserved water rights, legal 
regimes governing hydropower, and rules associated with development 
and management of water projects by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
82
 
Entirely different legal regimes protect water quality, even though 
laws governing surface waters contain some protections for instream 
flows, water conservation, and public interests in water.
83
  The primary 
legal tool for water-quality protection is the Clean Water Act.
84
  Despite 
a bold assertion of purpose—“to restore and maintain the chemical, 
                                                          
 78. On the fragmentation of water law generally, see Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some 
Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009 (2005). 
 79. See, e.g., George William Sherk, Meetings of Waters: The Conceptual Confluence of Water 
Law in Eastern and Western States, 5 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, 3–5, 47–49 (1991). 
 80. Klein, supra note 78, at 1059–64. 
 81. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: 
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 53, 56 (2010). 
 82. BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 604–12, 746–
59, 837–88, 1022–1134 (5th ed. 2013). 
 83. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); Stempel v. Dep’t of 
Water Res., 508 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1973) (finding that environmental impacts of proposed water 
diversion permit and fundamental state policy of an “ecological ethic” had to be considered in public 
welfare review of permit application); DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW 
PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE (1997); WASHINGTON DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 12-11-002, 2011 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: STATEWIDE PROGRESS ON 
SETTING INSTREAM FLOWS (2012); Christine A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example 
of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REV. 403 (2009); Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public 
Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473 (1988). 
 84. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”
85
—the CWA 
has a fragmented structure.  End-of-the-pipe discharges from industrial 
or wastewater systems, known as point source discharges, are subject to 
NPDES permit requirements and technology-based standards regarding 
the content of those discharges.
86
  Nonpoint source pollution—pollution 
from runoff—is subject to different kinds of regulation, though.  Urban 
stormwater systems are point sources when they discharge into 
waterways and are regulated under the Municipal Separate Storm Sewer 
System (MS4) program, which requires NPDES permits.
87
  MS4 came 
about through congressional amendment of the CWA in 1987,
88
 EPA 
adoption of Phase I regulations for large and medium stormwater 
systems in 1990,
89
 and EPA adoption of Phase II regulations for small 
stormwater systems in 1999.
90
  Municipalities subject to MS4 regulations 
and developers of sites one acre or larger must adopt “best management 
practices” (BMPs) to control runoff,
91
 but the CWA does not directly 
regulate the actual sources of runoff, such as urban and suburban homes 
or commercial landscapes.   
Agricultural sources of runoff are mostly unregulated, except for 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs).
92
  Various programs 
under both the CWA and the Farm Bill aim to create financial incentives 
to encourage agricultural producers to reduce runoff or the pollutants in 
runoff.  Moreover, states are required to establish water quality standards 
for surface waters and TMDLs for impaired waterways and then manage 
all sources of pollutants to comply with their TMDLs.
93
  But state laws 
and local ordinances, which are needed for states to reduce pollution, are 
often inadequate, ill-matched to the TMDL requirements, or lacking 
                                                          
 85. Id. § 1251(a). 
 86. See id. § 1342. 
 87. See id. § 1342(p). 
 88. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended in sections 
of 33 U.S.C.). 
 89. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm 
Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122–24). 
 90. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the Water 
Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68722 (Dec. 8, 1999) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122–124). 
 91. OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, STORMWATER PHASE II FINAL RULE: WHO’S COVERED? 
DESIGNATION AND WAIVERS OF REGULATED SMALL MS4S 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/fact2-1.pdf.  
 92. See sources cited supra note 26. 
 93. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012). 
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altogether.
94
  Moreover, groundwater quality receives almost no 
protection under the CWA.  Instead, it receives protection only from 
federal and state waste and hazardous-substances regulations, such as the 
Resource Conservation Recovery Act,
95
 the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
96
 and a 
variety of aquifer-specific state and local regulations.
97
 
The development of wetlands is regulated jointly by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers and the U.S. EPA under Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act, but only to the extent that the wetlands have an adequate 
nexus to navigable waters.
98
  Wetlands that do not have an adequate 
nexus to navigable waters might receive some protections under state or 
local regulations, depending on where they are located.
99
  Aquatic habitat 
of fauna receives protections under the ESA but only to the extent that 
human activities will adversely affect the habitat on which federally 
listed endangered or threatened species live.
100
  The relationship between 
the ESA and water rights has been characterized more by conflict than by 
cooperative integration,
101
 and has produced several cases in which 
regulators owed compensation to water rights holders for taking their 
property interests.
102
  Moreover, the legal system may favor one law over 
another, instead of integrating the two.  For example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that the EPA did not have to consult with the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service under the ESA when delegating water-quality 
permitting authority to the states under the CWA.
103
 
One area that is particularly fragmented is the intersection among 
land use, water supply, and water quality.  The relationships among these 
three aspects of the land–water interface are strongly interdependent and 
                                                          
 94. See sources cited supra note 28. 
 95. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2012). 
 96. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
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MISS. L. J. ONLINE 82 (2009). 
 100. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012). 
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Lake Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). 
 103. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 664, 673 (2007). 
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intertwined, yet the legal system treats each as separate and distinct.  
Land use and development are largely matters of local government law; 
water supply is a matter of state water-rights laws as well as water 
organizations’ planning and management authority; and water quality is 
mostly a matter of federal environmental law as delegated, at least partly, 
to state government.
104
  New “wet growth” policies and legal tools at 
local and state levels of government aim to take a more integrated 
approach to the relationship between land use and water, but many 
localities have not embraced them or are using them incompletely or 
ineffectively.
105
  Moreover, flood management—a matter of federal flood 
insurance policies and disaster planning requirements, local and state 
hazard planning, federal agency management of waterways and water 
infrastructure, and local control (or non-control) of stormwater runoff 
and development locations—is another legally fragmented element of the 
hydrologically integrated land–water nexus.
106
  Climate change will 
make all of these land–water interconnections more important and even 




At first glance, the fragmentation of water law might appear to be an 
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adaptive feature.  It is polycentric, and polycentrism is one of the core 
features of adaptive systems.
108
  Systemic resilience increases with both 
diversity of functions and responses to disturbance and modularity that 
compartmentalizes system features and therefore the effects of 
disturbances to those features (i.e., thus preventing the effects of extreme 
events or failures from spreading throughout the entire system).
109
  For 
example, if the TMDL system or Colorado’s water courts system were to 
prove ineffective or even fail altogether, other laws and systems 
protecting water quality and allocating and managing water-use rights 
would continue to function. 
Thus, water law’s fragmented features are not maladaptive simply 
because they divide authority and create diverse, modular centers of 
action and power.  They are maladaptive because they create governance 
scales and functions that are artificial, based on legal abstractions and 
political or administrative convenience, instead of organizing governance 
scales and functions around the scales and functions at which ecological 
systems and social systems intersect.
110
  The failure of environmental and 
natural resources law to use ecosystem scales of management and 
governance has long been criticized.
111
  Many experts in water 
management advocate for “Integrated Water Resource Management.”
112
  
Holly Doremus has argued that water management systems require the 
optimal degree of fragmentation that allows for variation, 
experimentation, and diffusion of risk and power, yet do not impede 
solutions to interconnected social-ecological problems at appropriate 
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 112. See, e.g., AM. WATER RES. ASS’N POLICY COMM., CASE STUDIES IN INTEGRATED WATER 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: FROM LOCAL STEWARDSHIP TO NATIONAL VISION (Brenda Bateman & 
Racquel Rancier eds., 2012), available at http://www.awra.org/committees/AWRA-Case-Studies-
IWRM.pdf; Hoffman & Zellmer, supra note 74. 
  
2014] ADAPTIVE WATER LAW 1065 
scales, including making trade-offs among competing policy goals.
113
 
Moreover, water law’s fragmented features are maladaptive because 
they impede adaptive responses to cross-scale or complex disturbances to 
water systems.  Adaptation often requires use of networks across 
institutional and disciplinary silos, some degree of cooperation among 
many stakeholders in water resources and systems, and the coordinated, 
yet experimental, use of multiple methods or instruments to respond to 
threats, risks, and disturbances.  One example is the integration of 
surface water and groundwater rights and regulations.  Another is 
coordination among TMDLs, MS4 permits, NPDES permits, USDA land 
and water conservation programs, local land-use planning and regulation, 
water-quality trading systems, public education, watershed planning and 
governance, forestry management, wetlands protections, and other legal 
regimes that affect water runoff and water quality.  The fragmented 
structure of water law is not merely polycentric and modular.  It is a 
system of legal silos that inhibit cross-scale, cross-function, cross-modal 
coordination or loose integration. 
III. A FRAMEWORK OF ADAPTIVE LAW 
U.S. institutions governing water resources need frameworks of 
adaptive rules and procedures that enhance institutional and societal 
capacity to adapt to changing conditions and unexpected disturbances.  
Recent scholarship on water resources and social-ecological resilience 
offers a variety of frameworks that can improve the adaptive capacity of 





 adaptive management of aquatic ecosystems,
116
 
climate change adaptation principles,
117
 and adaptive administrative 
law.
118
  All of these works both acknowledge substantial obstacles to 
achieving adaptive institutional capacity, yet offer important and 
promising proposals for legal reform. 
Adaptive capacity must be built into the legal system as a whole, not 
just specific resource management mandates or decision making 
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processes.  Starting with this premise, resilience ecologist Lance 
Gunderson and I developed a framework of structural features of an 
adaptive legal system.  Our “adaptive law” framework was published in a 
2013 article in the Environmental Law Reporter
119
 and a chapter of a 
2014 book published by Columbia University Press, Social-Ecological 
Resilience and Law, edited by Ahjond S. Garmestani and Craig R. 
Allen.
120
  This framework has four categories: adaptive goals, adaptive 
structure, adaptive methods, and adaptive processes.
121
 
A. Adaptive Goals 
Adaptive law aims to achieve multiple co-existent forms of 
resilience, a concept known as poly-resilience.
122
  In particular, a legal 
system that is adaptive to change serves to strengthen the adaptive 
capacity of both social systems, including institutions and communities, 
and ecological systems (or ecosystems).
123
  This is because the healthy 
functioning and adaptive capacity of various aspects of society—the 
economy, the political system, culture, and the like—and the healthy 
functioning and adaptive capacity of various ecosystems—such as 
watersheds, forests, and wetlands—are interdependent.
124
  If the legal 
system aims to advance the particular stability of just a single system, it 
risks harming all systems and contributing to the decline and collapse of 
both natural and human communities.
125
 
Much of the U.S. legal system today gives primacy to political goals, 
such as liberty or the diffusion of power, or economic goals, such as 
economic productivity and the efficient allocation and exchange of 
resources.
126
  These are worthwhile goals, but a single-minded focus on 
these goals can lead to ecological disaster, which in turn can threaten 
economies, communities, and political institutions.
127
  Hurricane 
Katrina’s devastation of New Orleans,
128
 the Deep Horizon BP oil spill in 
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the Gulf of Mexico,
129
 and losses from wildfires enabled by land-
development practices and fire suppression
130
 come to mind as examples.  
However, single-minded focus on environmental goals without regard to 
the effects of environmental protection laws on people and their welfare 
can backfire and eventually lead to more environmental harm when 
political forces push back against laws or when local economies decline, 




B. Adaptive Structure 
An adaptive law system is polycentric, diversifying exposure to risk, 
creating redundancies that can absorb shock, and facilitating adaptive 
innovation by spreading power and authority among multiple centers.
132
  
Power and authority are not concentrated in a single center, such as the 
federal government or the legislative branch, regardless of the temptation 
to overcome the perceived ineffectiveness of diffused power.
133
  A 
mistake or misjudgment by a single all-powerful entity, which is 
virtually inevitable given the cognitive and organizational limitations of 
humans, is likely to create a cascade of failure and collapse throughout 
multiple, interconnected systems.
134
  In contrast, polycentric systems 
make it harder for failure and collapse to spread.
135
  An adaptive law 
system also uses multiple modes, methods, and instruments to address 
problems at multiple scales, instead of selecting a single “optimal” mode, 
method or instrument that has the potential to fail or a single scale of 
governance that could be mismatched to the multiscalar features of 
complex problems.
136
  There are no panaceas in an adaptive governance 
system—no cookie-cutter, one-size-fits-all, magic-bullet solutions.
137
  
However, an adaptive law system aims for loose integration among the 
multiple centers and scales of governance and the multiple methods or 
                                                          
 129. See Brian R. Silliman et al., Degradation and Resilience in Louisiana Salt Marshes after the 
BP–Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11234 (2012). 
 130. See F. Stuart Chapin III et al., Planning for Resilience: Modeling Change in Human–Fire 
Interactions in the Alaskan Boreal Forest, 1 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 255 (2003). 
 131. Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 39, at 10428–32. 
 132. Id. at 10432–35. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 10434–36. 
 137. Id. at 10434.  See also Elinor Ostrom et al., Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 15176 (2007). 
  
1068 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
instruments that are used, in contrast to the relatively fragmented 
characteristics of a maladaptive legal system.
138
 
C. Adaptive Methods 
An adaptive law system facilitates social and ecological resilience 
through moderate evolution in rules, standards, processes, and structures 
as the system adapts to changing conditions.
139
  Change is neither 
resisted nor undertaken quickly and sweepingly.
140
  An adaptive law 
system uses context-regarding standards and flexible discretionary 
decision making, in contrast to legal abstractions, rigid rules, and 
excessive limits on action and authority.
141
  An adaptive law system also 
has a high tolerance for uncertainty, whereas the current legal system in 
the U.S. tends to demand certainty.
142
  Attempts to achieve certainty of 
outcomes, adhere to universally applicable rules, and prevent abuses of 
power are maladaptive when they fail to recognize that decision makers 
and actors need flexibility, discretion, and authority to respond to new 
situations, adapt to changing conditions, and experiment with various 
possible solutions to public problems.
143
 
D. Adaptive Processes 
An adaptive law system recognizes and embraces iterative processes 
among multiple participants, instead of linear decision making and 
implementation processes by a single authority.
144
  An adaptive law 
system recognizes limits to human and organizational rationality and the 
effects of social and ecological forces on the ordering and management 
of human affairs, whereas a maladaptive law system presumes that all 
decision making is rational and that the law is central to the ordering and 
management of human affairs.
145
  However, there are many potential 
adverse effects from bounded human knowledge and rationality and the 
broad discretion of decision makers and actors in iterative processes that 
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are not tightly constrained by law.
146
  An adaptive law system limits 
these effects by: a) mandating feedback loops by which the effects of 
decisions and actions are monitored and evaluated, lessons learned, and 
decisions or actions altered on the basis of lessons learned, and b) 
utilizing accountability mechanisms for the conservation of natural, 
human, social, political, and economic capital so that the functions of the 
basic infrastructure that supports nature and society are not impaired.
147
 
A table summarizing the features of an adaptive law framework, and 
contrasting them with a maladaptive legal system appears below: 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Features of Maladaptive Law and Adaptive Law
148
 
Feature Maladaptive Law Adaptive Law 
Goals Legal regimes aim to 
advance particular stability 
of single systems.  Current 
regimes focus primarily on 
political and economic 
goals.  Alternative (reform) 
regimes focus primarily on 
ecological goals. 
Legal regimes aim for multiple forms 
of resilience: the resilience and 
adaptive capacity of both social and 
ecological systems, including 
constituent subsystems, such as 
institutions and communities. 
Structure Law is monocentric, 
utilizing fragmented and 
unimodal responses to 
problems. 
Law is polycentric, utilizing 
multimodal and multiscalar responses 
to problems that are loosely 
integrated. 
Methods Law controls society 
through rules, limits on 
action and authority, 
demand for certainty, and 
legal abstractions that 
resist change. 
Law facilitates social and ecological 
resilience through 
moderate/evolutionary adaptation to 
changing conditions, context-
regarding standards, tolerance for 
uncertainty, and flexible 
discretionary decision making. 
Processes Law presumes rational, 
linear decision-making and 
implementation processes 
by a single authority and 
the centrality of law to the 
ordering and management 
of human affairs. 
Law recognizes and embraces 
iterative processes with feedback 
loops among multiple participants, 
limits to human and organizational 
rationality, and the effects of social 
and ecological forces on the ordering 
and management of human affairs, 
and accountability mechanisms for 
the conservation of capital. 
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IV. THE RESILIENT FUTURE: ADAPTIVE WATER LAW 
The adaptive law framework has great potential application to water 
law and the evolution of water law towards a more adaptive governance 
regime.  An adaptive water law regime that facilitates the resilience of 
communities and their waters, including the healthy functioning of 
watersheds and water bodies, is characterized by at least three features: 
1) shared risk among the stakeholders in a watershed and its waters; 2) 
conditional and flexible standards; and 3) integrated water governance.  
There are several other possible characteristics of an adaptive water law 
regime, which are beyond the scope of this particular article.  However, 
the three features that receive focused attention in this article contrast 
with the water law system’s maladaptive features of false security, rigid 
rules, and fragmented governance. 
A. Shared Risk 
An adaptive water law regime prompts and facilitates the sharing of 
risks by all stakeholders in a water system.  Risk avoidance and 
reduction are, in general, good strategies for a resource management 
system.  However, risk is inevitable, difficult to predict, and challenging 
to manage in complex and dynamic systems, as Sections II.A and II.B of 
this article describe.  Moreover, all stakeholders in a water system will 
inevitably share in exposure to those risks, in one way or another.  Both 
climate change and contemporary water demand-supply dynamics have 
effects that cannot be merely avoided or reduced through rules. 
Water transcends any single system for governing it and managing 
risks to the resource and its users.  Water is not a purely private resource, 
a purely public resource, or a purely common resource.  If it were a 
purely private resource, risks would be managed through property rules 
and market transactions.
149
  If it were a purely public resource, risks 
would be managed through government policies and controls.
150
  If it 
were a purely common resource, risks would be managed by common-
pool governance mechanisms like those studied by Nobel Laureate 
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Elinor Ostrom.
151
  Water has private, public, and common characteristics, 
though.
152
  Risk-sharing mechanisms that work across different types of 
resource management regimes can enhance the adaptive capacity of 
water institutions. 
Shared-risk systems and processes are necessary to balance and 
integrate the many critical functions that water provides to society.  
Water is essential to all biological life, yet it is also essential to economic 
activity, the vitality of communities, and the functioning of ecological 
systems.
153
  The breadth and importance of many different functions of 
water deter the development of a single governance or risk-management 
regime. 
Moreover, water is fluid, of course.  It does not remain in a single 
form or location and thus does not remain within the bounds of any 
particular type of governance regime.  Any given molecules of water 
move readily and even frequently among surface water bodies, 
groundwater, land, the atmosphere, organisms, and human-created 
systems (e.g., manufacturing processes, drinking-water or wastewater 
pipes, irrigation sprinklers). 
The risks from severe or prolonged drought, for example, will 
involve surface water flows and supplies, groundwater, runoff, wetlands, 
riparian lands and vegetation (including invasives and hydrophytes), 
evaporation and transpiration dynamics, demands from various users, 
and the like.  Thus, efforts to manage the risks will occur in many legal 
regimes, but none of the regimes will have adequate control over the 
problem to govern the risk.  These regimes include: private and public 
rights in surface waters (e.g., prior appropriation or regulated riparian 
systems; public trust doctrine; state ownership doctrine; federal 
navigation servitude; takings); private and public rights in groundwater; 
common-pool management systems for surface waters and/or 
groundwater; federal, state, and local government regulation of water 
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pollution; federal, state, and local government regulation of wetlands in 
the context of private property rights in land; the complex mix of 
regulatory and non-regulatory efforts to control runoff in the context of 
private property rights in land; state and local land-use plans and 
regulations; local and private water supply management plans and 
policies; policies and rules governing dams, reservoirs, and other 
waterworks; other environmental laws protecting aquatic resources (e.g., 
the Endangered Species Act); and so forth.  Thus, risks to aquatic 
systems transcend any single legal or governance regime. 
Rules do not secure certainty of risks and risk allocation well in 
complex, interconnected, dynamic sets of systems, like those affecting 
water resources.  For example, the prior appropriation system attempts to 
allocate the risks of water shortages in rivers in order of priority in time, 
from the most junior appropriators to the most senior appropriators.  In 
reality, this risk allocation system is often ignored, is circumvented at 
least to some degree, or fails.
154
  This is due to the complexities of return 
flows, the locations of various appropriators’ withdrawals, the 
administrative difficulties of seniors enforcing their rights against 
juniors, surface water–groundwater interactions (including seepage), the 
effects of hydrophytes and evaporation, changing streambed and 
streambank characteristics, and various public policy considerations that 
can override the legal rules.
155
  Water users often find themselves sharing 




Likewise, the water problems of Las Vegas, described in the 
Introduction of this article, illustrate the inadequacies of legal rules as 
fortresses against future uncertainties.  Whether Las Vegas should have 
been built in its very arid location or allowed to grow as it has is beside 
the point now.  The reality is that Las Vegas needs water under 
conditions of supply instability and shrinking supplies, and that our 
political system is not going to let Las Vegas go dry, given its size and 
cultural and economic importance nationally.  Las Vegas’s water 
problems are now the problems of all the signatories to the Colorado 
River Compact, regardless of whether it’s fair, environmentally 
unsustainable, or legally mandated.  Likewise, Las Vegas’s water 
problems are now the problems of eastern Nevada rural communities, 
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regardless of who wins or loses Las Vegas’s current efforts to secure 
groundwater pumping rights.  By the same token, though, Las Vegas 
shares in the risks of over-pumping eastern Nevada groundwater, 
including the impacts on the long-term sustainability of those water 
supplies, the environment, and the local communities. 
An adaptive law regime has to address questions of fairness, 
environmental sustainability, community impact, efficient use of 
resources, individual rights, and the like.  It must aim to avoid or reduce 
unnecessary risks.  It performs these functions, though, by expressly 
acknowledging and facilitating the affected parties’ sharing of risk, not 
by trying to prevent change and secure a false certainty about resource 
arrangements. 
One element of an adaptive law regime that facilitates sharing of 
risks is to reduce the use of property rights as after-the-fact insurance 
policies against change or as opt-outs from sharing risks.  This idea does 
not call for the elimination of private property rights or the “decline” of 
private property.
157
  Private property rights can be highly adaptive 
features of the socio-legal system if they are flexible and evolve over 
time,
158
 and government controls over resources can at times be less 
adaptive than private use and management of resources.  However, rigid 
and unchangeable property rights are poorly suited to changing 
conditions and the capacity of linked social-ecological systems to adapt 
to significant disturbances.  The legal system must embrace 
modifications in property rights that are necessitated by changed 
environmental and social conditions that are experienced by interest-
holders generally.  It must also differentiate between: a) compensable 
takings of private rights by the government to benefit some interests over 
others, and b) non-compensable adjustments to private rights due to 
changing social and environmental conditions that are part of the bargain 
of holding property interests in a dynamic social-environmental system.  
Private property rights are not guarantees against social-ecological 
change. 
Another element of an adaptive law regime is to use multi-
participant watershed governance systems to facilitate risk-sharing.  
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Many of the risks that people, organizations, and communities share in 
linked social-ecological aquatic systems are encountered at watershed 
scales and involve watershed processes and functions.  Many watershed 
governance systems involve some degree of collaborative problem 
solving in the context of uncertainty, disturbances to water resources in 
the watershed, and risks shared by many interests.
159
  Multi-participant 
watershed planning, management, and governance processes can produce 
many different actions aimed at enhancing the overall adaptive capacity 
of the watershed and its communities, economies, and stakeholders.  





 adaptive restoration of watershed 
features,
162
 water-quality credit trading systems,
163
 riparian or aquifer-
recharge-zone land conservation,
164
 new land-use controls,
165
 shared 
pollution or runoff reduction efforts,
166





 water supply planning under 
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Protection and Management, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, http://edwardsaquifer.org/recharge-
zone-protection (last visited Mar. 01, 2014).  
 165. CITY OF OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON, LOW-IMPACT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR GREEN 
COVE BASIN: A CASE STUDY IN REGULATORY PROTECTION OF AQUATIC HABITAT IN URBANIZING 
WATERSHEDS (2002), available at http://www.psparchives.com/publications/our_work/stormwater/ 
lid/ordinances/Green_Cove.pdf.  
 166. Our Missouri Waters, MO DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., https://www.dnr.mo.gov/omwi.htm 
(last visited Mar. 01, 2014) (state program focused on local watershed-based plans and projects for 
shared runoff and pollution reductions).  
 167. See Green City, Clean Waters, PHILADELPHIA WATER DEPARTMENT, http://www.philly 
watersheds.org/what_were_doing/documents_and_data/cso_long_term_control_plan (last visited 
Mar. 01, 2014).   
 168. ROARING FORK CONSERVANCY, OPPORTUNITIES FOR WATER CONSERVATION: REALIZING 
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conditions of uncertainty and change,
169
 and others.  The basic premise is 
that risks to the linked social-ecological systems in the watershed are 
collective risks that must be addressed collectively. 
A shared-risk management approach to water law meets the criteria 
of an adaptive law system.  First, it addresses both risks to and the 
resilience of multiple systems, both ecological and social, thus 
facilitating pursuit of poly-resilient goals.  Second, a shared-risk 
management approach requires the use of multiple risk management 
methods at multiple scales of disturbance and multiple levels or centers 
of governance.  Thus, it makes use of an adaptive legal structure.  Third, 
shared-risk management methods necessarily have a reasonable tolerance 
for uncertainty, require flexibility, and adapt over time to changing 
conditions, all of which are adaptive methods of resource governance.  
Finally, a shared-risk management approach features iterative processes 
of both cooperation among multiple participants and risk management 
decision making and implementation, ideally with feedback loops that 
allow decision makers to learn from the effects of their decisions under 
dynamic and complex conditions and make adjustments to their risk-
sharing strategies.  Thus, it utilizes adaptive processes. 
B. Conditional and Flexible Standards 
An adaptive law framework uses conditional and flexible standards, 
instead of rigid rules.  Institutions cannot adapt to disturbances or 
changes if their decision makers lack discretion and flexibility, because 
they are bound by rigid, narrow rules.  Decision makers need authority 
and flexibility to: a) consider the broad ecological and social contexts of 
their decisions, including multiscalar relationships and dynamics; b) 
address potential risks, multiple possible scenarios or models, and the 
resilience of both ecological and social systems; and c) experiment with 
possible management or governance options, adapting as they learn from 
monitoring and assessing the effects of their decisions and actions.
170
 
While rigid rules prevent adaptive behaviors and give a false sense of 
security that particular social-ecological outcomes will be maintained, 
they also prevent abuses of discretion by resource managers.  An 
adaptive law regime does not embrace standard-less discretion and 
                                                          
 169. SANTA ANA WATERSHED PROJECT AUTHORITY, ONE WATER, ONE WATERSHED: 2010 
SANTA ANA INTEGRATED WATERSHED PLAN, ch. 5.9 (2010), available at http://www.sawpa.org/ 
owow-1-0-2/. 
 170. Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 39, at 10436. 
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flexibility.
171
  Instead, adaptive law requires that decisions and actions 
are adaptive and conform to standards that enhance the resilience of both 
ecosystems and social systems.  In other words, adaptive law embraces 
principled flexibility.
172
  Standards for discretionary decisions and 
adaptive management actions guard against decision makers’ abuses of 
discretion and decisions that do not comport with the applicable goals for 
water governance.  At the same time, principled standards do not pre-
determine or pre-restrict actions with fixed, narrow, inflexible rules. 
There are several measures by which to develop and apply principled 
standards governing water resources.  They include: 
 
1) predicted or known thresholds or tipping points at which     
ecosystems or linked social-ecological systems decline 




2) performance measures based on ecosystem function or  
social-ecological function, including the authority for 
planners, managers, resource users, and regulated parties 









4) co-benefits standards that aim for multiple ecological and  




5) the public trust doctrine, which requires conservation of  
    both natural and social capital in water resources,    
    provided  that the public trust doctrine is actually  
    implemented in water resource decisions.
177
 
                                                          
 171. Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in 
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239 (2008). 
 172. Craig, supra note 46. 
 173. See Ahjond S. Garmestani & Melinda Harm Benson, A Framework for Resilience-based 
Governance of Social-Ecological Systems, 18(1) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 9 (2013). 
 174. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
424 (2010). 
 175. See Craig, supra note 46. 
 176. Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 39, at 10436. 
 177. For arguments for a robust public trust doctrine as an adaptive standard aimed at the 
resilience of linked social-ecological systems, see MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE (2013); Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 39, 
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Another means of using conditional and flexible standards is to make 
all water-use and water-quality permits time-limited, conditional permits 
that are renewable but revisable at the renewal period.  Permitting 
agencies could tailor the conditions of the permit to the ecological and 
social context of the proposed water use or discharge, specifically 
including adaptive conditions and conditions that facilitate social-
ecological resilience.  If permit holders are required to seek renewal 
periodically, permitting agencies could make adjustments to the 
permitted activities as required by changed conditions or new 
information learned from implementing the permit.  Florida’s regional 
water management districts issue conditional, time-limited, renewable, 
and revisable water permits,
178
 and some land-use regulatory authorities 
follow this practice for conditional land-use permits.
179
 
Change from rigid rules to flexible standards is already underway.  
The rigidity of prior appropriation rules is eroding.  Priority is rarely 
strictly enforced as a practical matter, despite the persistence of the rule 
itself.
180
  Recently, Reed Benson has called our attention to three western 
water cases that infuse more flexibility into water rights than the strict 
application of the prior appropriation doctrine would allow; he argues 
that the traditional rules of prior appropriation are not dead but are 
increasingly irrelevant as water law evolves.
181
 
Conditional and flexible standards are adaptive discretionary 
methods within the adaptive law framework: context-regarding 
standards, flexible, discretionary decision making, and moderate or 
evolutionary adaptation to changing conditions.  Principled standards 
provide accountability to poly-resilient goals (e.g., the conservation of 
both natural capital and social capital) and provide the metrics against 
which water governance decisions and methods can be evaluated via 
                                                          
at 10441–42; Arnold, supra note 152, at 789.  For discussions of the obstacles to implementation of 
the public trust doctrine, see Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic: 
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(2012). 
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http://www.sjrwmd.com/permitting/ (last visited Mar. 03, 2014).  
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Anaheim Planning Commission from 1999 to 2002. 
 180. See A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, Or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 
881, 894 (2000); Tarlock, supra note 154. 
 181. Reed Benson, Alive but Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western 
Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 675 (2012). 
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feedback loops and iterative decision-making processes.  Polycentric, 
multimodal, multiscalar, and integrated water governance structures 
function better when they employ conditional and flexible standards 
rather than when they are constrained by rigid rules. 
C. Integrated Water Governance 
Adaptive water law facilitates integrated governance of water 
resources in at least three respects: 1) governance and management of 
water, land, and the environment at scales at which social systems and 
ecosystems interact and affect one another; 2) involvement of all the 
participants—public and private, individuals and organizations, 
regulators, managers, users, and advocates—in water system governance 
(sometimes called multi-stakeholder participation); and 3) flexible but 
coordinated use of multiple methods and tools for adaptively governing, 
managing, and conserving water resources, including adaptive planning, 
regulatory, legal, market, educational, and adaptive management tools, 
among others. 
These concepts appear in Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM).
182
  IWRM’s fourteen principles include the integration of water 
management, environmental management, and land-use planning 
“conjunctively with codependent natural resources, namely soil, forests, 
air and biota.”
183
  It uses a systems approach that is attentive to individual 
components, interdependent linkages, and the role of disturbances and 
resilience.  It calls for: “full participation by all stakeholders” in 
transparent, accountable, adaptive, and locally-based decision making; 
attention to the social impacts of water policies; improvement of 
information availability, information use, and institutional capacity; the 
equitable allocation of water resources; and regard for the “hydrological, 
bio-physical, economic, social and environmental characteristics of a 
catchment” when making decisions, among others.
184
  However, the term 
“management” in IWRM suggests that it is focused primarily or solely 
on management actions, instead of a broader set of governance structures 
and legal decisions.  Recent work on adaptive water planning and 
                                                          
 182. See AM. WATER RES. ASS’N, supra note 112; Jeffry S. Wade, Privatization and the Future 
of Water Services, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 179, 192–96 (2008).  For an excellent discussion of the 
opportunities and barriers to integrated management of groundwater and surface water, using 
Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska as case studies, see Hoffman & Zellmer, supra note 74. 
 183. Wade, supra note 182, at 194. 
 184. Id. at 194–96. 
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adaptive water governance incorporates many IWRM principles but 
focuses on broader governance institutions.
185
 
Water resource governance institutions need to be organized at 
geographic scales at which feedback loops among various ecosystems—
aquatic, terrestrial, climate, and others—and various social systems—
political systems, water-resource economies, local communities, and 
others—intersect with one another.  Experts have long argued that 
resource management and regulation should occur at ecosystem scales.
186
  
In particular, experts have argued for water governance and management 
at watershed scales.
187
  Watersheds are aquatic ecosystems organized in 
nested scales from small catchments to large river basins, thus allowing 
for multiscalar governance structures that match governance functions 
with the appropriate geographic scale of the problems and social-
ecological dynamics that need to be addressed.
188
  Disturbances to water 
resources and changing water conditions can best be addressed at 
watershed scales where societal and ecological systems interact.  The 
development of watershed governance institutions enhances the adaptive 
capacity of society to address many interconnected aspects and functions 
of nature and society. 
Adaptive water law also engages many stakeholders in water 
governance and builds participatory networks that give these institutions 
legitimacy, greater opportunities for problem-solving innovations, and 
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improved capacity to implement solutions and policies adaptively.
189
  
Integration of participation does not mean that a governance system is 
solely or primarily bottom-up or consensus-based.  Integrated 
participatory approaches can be used with top-down and hybrid top-
down/bottom-up processes.  Hybrid processes and structures tend to 
characterize watershed planning, management, and governance, despite 
the mistaken tendency to think of these processes as purely grassroots 
collaboration.  Moreover, iterative processes of participation include 
cycles or even mixes of cooperation, legal conflict (e.g., litigation), 
political conflict (e.g., legislative or regulatory decisions), and semi-
autonomous action (e.g., voluntary conservation measures).  
Nonetheless, Cosens and Stow have argued that the construction and 
maintenance of entity and stakeholder networks in linked water systems 
help to build and maintain system resilience and the adaptive capacity of 
the governance institutions.
190
  Moreover, recent empirical research 




Adaptive water law also integrates the use of multiple methods, 
tools, and instruments for governing water resources.  This approach has 
been called “integrationist multimodality” or a coordinated toolbox 
approach to resource issues.
192
 
Integrationist multimodality is the use of multiple modes or methods 
of achieving a policy goal in a way that integrates or interconnects these 
multiple modes or methods.  I have posited that integrationist 
multimodality is a new, emerging generation of environmental law and 
policy, which has previously been unimodal and fragmented, and 
consequently, maladaptive and inadequate.  Unimodality is the choice of 
a particular mode, instrument, method, or design as “optimal” and is 
frequently characterized by advancement of a particular model or 
uniform, one-size-fits-all approach.  For example, the classic debate 
                                                          
 189. Many authors have addressed the importance of participatory structures and processes to 
adaptive water governance.  See, e.g., EDELLA SCHLAGER & WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, EMBRACING 
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(2013). 
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regarding the effectiveness of command-and-control regulations versus 
market mechanisms is a unimodal choice.  However, many examples of 
unimodality are more fine-grained: model statutes or ordinances, 
standard design or management procedures, uniform laws, the new 
preferred program or policy of the day, and so forth.  In contrast, 
“multimodality” is a tool-box approach.  It facilitates multiple actors’ 
selections from a variety of instruments, methods, and tools to respond to 
complex problems.
193
  Moreover, these multiple modes can be, and often 
are, linked, although uniformly tight linkages—true integration—can 
transmit disturbances and shocks throughout the system, producing 
cascade effects that lead to system decline or collapse.  Loose 
connections or networks—integrationist, rather than integrated—offer 




Integrated water governance manifests the adaptive law framework 
in many respects.  It focuses on the integrated effort to improve 
resilience and adaptive capacity in ecosystems, especially watersheds, 
and social systems, especially those with tight links to water resources.  
Thus, it advances poly-resilient goals.  It is adaptively structured around 
multiple scales (especially multiple scales of watersheds) and the loosely 
integrated use of multiple governance methods or instruments.  
Integrated water governance could theoretically be monocentric, 
centralized in a single federal government agency, for example.  
However, in practice, the multiscalar and multi-participant nature of 
integrated water governance means that it is actually polycentric, as 
evidenced by the large number of watershed governance institutions 
across the U.S.  However, these watershed governance institutions seek 
and often do transcend (at least partially) the organizational, political, 
and disciplinary silos created by traditional water law and water 
governance systems.  Integrated water governance also uses iterative 
processes with feedback loops among multiple participants and addresses 
the effects of social and ecological forces in the management of human 
affairs, instead of overestimating the ability of law and governance 
institutions to control social-ecological dynamics.  Integrated water 
governance enhances institutional, social, and ecological adaptive 
capacity by organizing around the interconnections in ecosystem-social 
legal-system dynamics. 
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V. EVOLUTION IN WATER LAW: ADAPTIVE WATERSHED GOVERNANCE 
Despite the maladaptive features of water law in the U.S., the system 
has adaptive features and capacity.  One particularly promising 
adaptation to changing conditions and current systemic inadequacies is 
the emergence of watershed governance institutions, which in turn are 
adapting to opportunities, threats, disturbances, and changing 
conditions.
195
  This phenomenon is emerging from a mix of law-driven 
disturbances (e.g., the shadow of federal statutes and regulations, the 
effects or prospects of litigation), legal reforms (e.g., watershed planning 
statutes), self-organizing collaborative behaviors around watersheds, and 
community attempts to address specific water problems that are not 
addressed by existing legal frameworks.  Law, society, and nature are not 
autonomous, self-contained systems, and the dynamic interaction of 




In California for example, the Santa Ana Watershed Project 
Authority’s (SAWPA) 2010 Santa Ana Integrated Watershed Plan is an 
example of such adaptive watershed governance.
197
  First, the plan adopts 
a shared-risk strategy.  It recognizes that climate change is occurring and 
that climate change is and will adversely impact the watershed as well as 
the region’s water supply, economy, environmental health, and 
community vitality.
198
  It recognizes that there are a variety of 
quantitatively different climate change models that all simultaneously 
undermine the value of relying on past data, yet fail to provide a 
definitive prediction of future conditions.
199
  However, the plan evaluates 
its strategies for watershed management by applying a range of plausible 
models of future temperatures, precipitation, and sea level rise to address 
likely impacts in the watershed: increased evaporation and transpiration; 
increased water demands; longer, hotter, and more frequent heat waves; 
increased wildfire risks; higher peak energy demands; diminished air 
quality; changes in water temperatures; decreased water quality and 
related biotic stresses; decreased precipitation on supplies of imported 
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water; increased flood risks; decreased groundwater replenishment; and 
risks to the reliability of local water supplies.
200
  The plan considers 
climate change analyses in connection with other sources of uncertainty 
and change, including Colorado River drought conditions, San Joaquin 
Delta vulnerability, and population growth and development.
201
 
Moreover, all stakeholders in the watershed are to share in the risks 
associated with changing climate, water supplies, water demands, and 
watershed conditions, through tools like water conservation measures, 
changes in land-use planning and regulation, conjunctive management of 
surface water and groundwater with increased storage of water in the 
basin for future needs, public education programs, greater use of rainfall 
as a basin-wide water source, and increased use of best management 
practices (BMPs) to control and reduce polluted stormwater runoff.
202
 
Second, the plan adopts conditional and flexible standards for 
adaptive implementation of the plan, instead of rigid rules.  A variety of 
specific implementation strategies are guided by several goals and 
strategies.  The goals are: 
Provide reliable water supply; 
Preserve and enhance the environment; 
Promote sustainable water solutions; 
Ensure high quality water for all users; 
Provide economically effective solutions; 
Improve regional integration and coordination; 
Manage rainfall as a resource; 
Preserve open-space and recreational opportunities, and 
Maintain quality of life.
203
 





Consider stormwater as water supply; 
Value water differently; 
Maximize preservation and use of native plants; 
Develop risk-based WQ improvements 
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Incorporate integrated water planning in General Plans 
Manage public property for more than one use; 
Create watershed governance; and 
Implement watershed-wide education programs.
204
 
Some specific action items—also context-specific, flexible, and 
adaptive—include developing additional storage for recycled water, 
developing new pathogen indicators and new residual chlorine standards, 
reconsidering whether flood risk management should continue to be 
based on 100-year flood probabilities created from historic data, and 
changing landscaping practices to increase pervious hard surfaces, 
pavers, bio-swales, new irrigation technology, and water-efficient 
gardens in comprehensive landscape planning and consumer packages.
205
 
Third, as the above-listed goals and strategies indicate, the plan is an 
integrated plan for watershed governance.  It is organized around and 
focuses on the Santa Ana River Watershed.  It creates a poly-resilient 
vision of “a sustainable Watershed that is drought-proofed, salt-balanced, 
and supports economic and environmental viability.”
206
  It integrates 
different fields of law and governance, including water supply, water 
quality, surface water, groundwater, land-use planning and regulation, 
and energy, among others.  The planning process integrated “the local 
agencies, organizations and other interested parties within the Santa Ana 
River Watershed.”
207
  It coordinates and integrates the use of multiple 
methods and tools to address the many interdependent threats to the 
watershed’s functions and resilience.  SAWPA and the many 
stakeholders involved in the Santa Ana River planning effort have 
improved on the plan that they adopted in 2010.  On February 4, 2014, 
SAWPA adopted the One Water, One Watershed Plan 2.0 (OWOW 2.0), 
which reiterates the foundational goals of the original plan but also 
strengthens the structures and processes for integrated and collaborative 
management, adds specific performance standards or targets to achieve 
by 2035, and develops monitoring, assessment, and plan revision 
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Another example is the Blackfoot Challenge, which is a multi-
participant collaboration to protect the Blackfoot River watershed in 
Montana.
209
  The Blackfoot Challenge is a grassroots organization that 
consists of over 100 ranchers and farmers in the Blackfoot River 
watershed as well as twenty-seven federal and state agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and 
Trout Unlimited were instrumental in starting the Blackfoot Challenge 
with area ranchers and farmers to address watershed problems in ways 
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Apr. 13, 2014); Jerri Kershner, Restoring Stream Flows and Habitat: Lessons from the Blackfoot 
River Watershed in Montana, CLIMATE ADAPTATION KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE (July 25, 2011), 
http://www.cakex.org/case-studies/4014 (case study on a project of the Big Blackfoot Chapter of 
Trout Unlimited, Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, and Montana Trout Unlimited.  Product of 
EcoAdapt’s State of Adaptation Program). 
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that are more flexible and participatory than the implementation of rigid 
command-and-control regulatory regimes like the Endangered Species 
Act.  While the organization is collaborative and voluntary, it has not 
shied away from adopting standards to improve the resilience of the 
watershed and its local community.  It began by providing information, 
education, and technical assistance for noxious weed control, cattle 
BMPs for riparian protection, proactive bear interaction management, 
and proactive wolf interaction management.  Eventually, it created and 
funded a land and conservation easement program that limited land 
development to protect the rural way of life in the Blackfoot Valley and 
the environmental quality of the watershed.  More recently, the Blackfoot 
Challenge developed a Drought Response Plan for addressing the 
impacts of climate change, which calls for shared reductions in usage 
during times of drought regardless of the participants’ prior appropriation 
rights.  Despite the collaborative, voluntary nature of the Blackfoot 
Challenge, water quality and flows, aquatic species health, and wildlife-
human interaction patterns have improved in the watershed.  This 
collaboration exemplifies the role of shared risk, conditional and flexible 
standards, and the integrated water governance that can arise in the 
shadow of less adaptive legal regimes, which can improve social-
ecological resilience and a community’s adaptive capacity. 
In another example, statutorily-mandated watershed planning has 
produced surprisingly resilient and adaptive watershed governance 
systems.  Formal state-mandated watershed planning processes can 
produce unanticipated consequences as legal requirements intersect with 
multiple and evolving frames of watersheds.  In 1998, the Washington 
Legislature enacted the Watershed Planning Act, which mandates water-
supply planning for Watershed Resource Inventory Areas (WRIAs), 
which are state-designated hydro-geographic units.
 210
  Multi-participant 
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watershed planning groups are required to plan for future off-stream uses 
in relationship to minimum instream flows with a goal of obtaining 
maximum citizen input.  Optional elements of the planning process 
include establishment of water-quality goals, habitat conditions, and 
minimum instream flows.  Nonetheless, many watershed groups have 
engaged in integrated planning regarding these optional elements and 
have chosen to pursue shared-risk strategies.  The content of watershed 
plans has varied considerably across WRIAs.  Some WRIA planning 
units developed watershed-focused zoning and land-use regulations to 
protect waters from polluted runoff, which were adopted by local 
governments.  Some engaged in planning for climate change.  The 
planning processes created demand for data and scientific modeling of 
climate change impacts at local or watershed scales.  Instead of adopting 
inflexible rules about future water conditions, they are seeking flexible 
standards based on watershed-function and climate-change indicators.  
Some planning groups had difficulty overcoming constraints on capacity 
(e.g., resources, expertise, trust), but most overcame these constraints 
and produced adaptive plans.  Many watershed planning groups have 
continued to operate long after they adopted their plans, even though 
they are not legally required to do so.  Furthermore, the Washington 
Department of Ecology uses watershed assessments developed by 
WRIAs in the watershed planning process to evaluate new water rights 
permit proposals. 
The list of adaptive watershed governance systems includes Eastern 
watersheds.  In the Green River of Kentucky, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and The Nature Conservancy have adaptively managed a 
federal dam and related water flows to control flooding and protect 
endangered mussels downstream.  They have also created conservation 
easements to protect water quality and are starting an adaptive watershed 
planning process.
211
  The Anacostia River Watershed in Maryland and 
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the District of Columbia has seen cooperation between urban and 
upstream suburban/rural communities to adaptively restore and protect 
the Anacostia in pursuit of co-benefits through integrated methods that 
extend beyond legal mandates: 
 
 A multi-jurisdictional agreement among Maryland, the District of 
Columbia, Montgomery County (MD), and Prince George’s County 
(MD) for watershed restoration and protection; 
 The Eastern Montgomery County Master Plan with policies for 
headwater protections, down-zoning in trout-spawning areas, 
impervious cover limits, and land acquisition in stream valleys; 
 A comprehensive plan for the Paint Branch watershed (a 
subwatershed); 
 The designation of the upper Paint Branch area as a Special Protection 
Area in the County Code, with conservation buffers for streams, 
wetlands, springs, and floodplains, requirements of a water quality 
plan for all public and private projects in the area, and limits on 
impervious cover to ten percent of the surface area or any 
development site unless the developer uses off-site mitigation or 
obtains a waiver; 
 The designation of an Environmental Overlay Zone that restricts 
certain land uses near the upper Pain Branch’s headwaters; 
 The conditioning of land-use and environmental permits on 
stormwater runoff minimization and mitigation, best management 
practices to avoid erosion or sediment runoff, dedication of open space 
and buffer areas, and limits on impervious cover; 
 Park acquisition planning for government acquisition of identified 
riparian and sensitive headwater lands, and implementation of plans 
with significant acquisitions of carefully selected critical lands; 
 Altering public land and facility operations that were polluting the 
Anacostia River, such as a bus depot leeching oil or the National Zoo 
dumping animal waste; 
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 Upgrading wastewater and sewer facilities; 
 Trash and litter cleanup projects; 
 Restoration projects that have stabilized stream bank erosion, replaced 
artificial channels with natural streambed characteristics, restored 
degraded wetlands, returned native species to creeks, and planted trees 
and vegetation in riparian zones; 
 The protection of watershed-serving features of privately owned lands 
with conservation easements on tens of thousands of acres; 
 An environmental compliance outreach program for auto repair shops 
in the Hickey Run subwatershed; 
 A project to involve local residents, including low-income inner city 
school children, in small-scale watershed restoration efforts, such as 
stream cleanup projects, planting native trees, stenciling storm drains, 
and offering public education about the watershed and its conditions; 
 Extensive activities of the Anacostia Watershed Society, involving 
tens of thousands of volunteers in public engagement with and support 
for watershed protection through activities such as watershed 
stewardship photo essays, recreation-based education about the 
watershed, elementary school science programs based on student 
interaction with the river ecosystem, teacher training, newsletters, fish 
propagation projects, tree and native-plant planting projects, storm 
drain stenciling, non-native plant removal projects, river and trash 
cleanup, stream bank stabilization projects, and river tours.
212
 
Watershed governance is not a panacea that will provide all the 
social-ecological resilience and adaptive capacity that water law needs.
213
  
There are substantial barriers to watershed protection and governance for 
social-ecological resilience.
214
  Adaptive and collaborative planning and 
management at watershed scales might produce only psychologically and 
socially satisfying cooperation (e.g., the development of social capital) 
without substantial improvements in ecosystem health and function.
215
  
Watershed governance might fail to develop fully adaptive structures and 
systems, including the use of feedback loops to evaluate the 
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implementation of plans, programs, and legal reforms.
216
 
Nonetheless, watershed-based governance institutions are increasing 
in number, roles, and impact in water resource management in the U.S.  
They offer important lessons for water law about adaptation to 
disturbances and changing conditions.  Many watershed governance 
institutions use shared-risk strategies, conditional and flexible standards, 
and integrated water governance structures and processes.  They are 
changing how water law functions in the U.S. and pointing the way to 
make water law more adaptive for social-ecological resilience. 
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